



PARTY LEGISLATION: QUO VADIS AND HOW? 
 




The "revision of legislation on political parties accordingly to European norms"[1] 
is one of legal actions that the Republic of Moldova should take in line with the 
Resolution and Recommendations by the Committee on the Honouring of 
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). 
The Parliament has pledged to honour this commitment by the end of the 2006 
summer session, accordingly to the political consensus. But the speaker 
acknowledged at the end of the 2007 summer session that this commitment was 
not honoured, and promised that it would be tackled and fulfilled by the end of 
this year. As 2008 is a pre-electoral year, the Parliament was expected to 
approach the modification of the legislation on political parties, trying to adopt 
new regulations in this area. But what will be the new regulations, will they 
envisage the examination of the 2006 draft only or an ampler legislative package, 
these are questions that both the governors and the opposition will have to 
answer as soon as possible. Given the complexity of the problems, ample and 
appropriate answers are recommended. 
I. Evolution of legal-normative framework 
A short summary of evolutions regarding the existing legal framework and 
modification processes is required before assessing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the draft law from the priority agenda of the Parliament. 
1. Law # 718-XII from 17.09.91concerning parties and other social-political 
organisations 
The document regulating the principles of building, functioning and dissolution of 
parties and other social-political organisations (hereinafter parties) was adopted 
much time before the enforcement of the new Constitution of the country. 
Although it has undergone 12 modifications, the law is out-of-date and does not 
comply with modern standards, requirements and criteria in the area, in 
particular: 
• The Constitutional Court has examined many norms of the law[2];  
• A series of regulations are regarded as restrictive and contrary to 
European democratic standards[3];  
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• Many contradictions occur when authorities apply this law, some 
interpretations affect the freedom of political association, other related 
rights[4];  
• International institutions recommend insistently the revision of the 
Moldovan legislation on parties[5].  
2. Relevant decisions by Constitutional Court 
A. Under Decision # 37 from 10.12.98 concerning interpretation of Article 41 (1) 
of the Moldovan Constitution, the Constitutional Court ruled as follows: 
• The Constitution does not obstruct the voluntary association of citizens 
into parties and other social-political organisations, but every political 
association of citizens (party or social-political organisation) must obtain a 
status of legal entity, in order to honour the goal for which it was created;  
• The establishing of additional criteria resulting from the goal of building 
political associations – gaining the power – is not excluded. In this respect, 
the legislator could establish other criteria for registration of a political 
party as regards the mode of building, the goal of building, the existence 
of a patrimony, of an independent structure, registration of party, respect 
for the representation principle;  
• The representation principle does not contravene to the constitutional 
freedom of association of citizens, but it could be unconstitutional if its 
effects suppress the right to association or if it produces suppressing 
effects;  
• The legal regulation of the mode and conditions of participation of parties 
and other social-political organisations in elections is based on provisions 
of an organic law accordingly to Article 72 (3) (a) of the Constitution.  
B. The Constitutional Court concludes in the Decision # 3 from 29.01.99 
concerning the control on constitutionality of some provisions of the Law # 146-
XIV from September 30, 1998: 
• The establishing of the numerical criterion of representation of parties 
rests with an organic law, that means with the discretion of the Parliament, 
and the Court cannot examine it as long as its effects do not suppress the 
political pluralism principle stipulated by Article 1 (3) of the Constitution;  
• Article 41 (2) of the Constitution stipulates that parties and other social-
political organisations are equal in front of the law, that means parties 
must not be discriminated when they are created, they are ensured 
optimal conditions for an efficient work aimed to accomplish the statute-
related goals;  
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• The introduction by the law of a term for a new registration of political 
parties accordingly to the new legally imposed requirements does not 
discriminate parties.  
C. The Constitutional Court adopted on June 3, 2003 the Decision # 11 on 
control of constitutionality of some provisions of the Law # 718-XII from 
September 17, 1991 "Concerning parties and other social-political organisations," 
noting as follows: 
• The introduction of a minimum number of party members in 2nd-level 
administrative territorial units needed for the registration of a party meets 
the constitutional norms, given the representation criterion which rests 
with the discretion of the legislature;  
• The record measures and responsibilities imposed to decision makers of 
parties, the presentation of reports to some public institution by these 
persons, and the collection of signatures of party members do not restrict 
the freedom of association into parties guaranteed by Article 41 (1) of the 
Constitution;  
• The provisions requiring the registration of membership of a party or other 
social-political organisation meet the supreme law;  
• The Parliament cannot extend the dissolution requirements as a form of 
sanctioning political parties over constitutional norms strictly delimited by 
Article 41 (4), and political parties and other social-political organisations 
can be liquidated only accordingly to Article 41 of the Constitution and with 
the notification of the Constitutional Court;  
• If Article 41 (4) of the Constitution is violated, the measures taken to 
prohibit or forcedly dissolute political parties will be considered exceptional 
and accordingly to the proportionality principle stipulated by Article 54 (4) 
of the Constitution.  
3. Draft law on parties and other social-political organisations (2000). 
On August 2, 2000, the Government approved and delivered to the Parliament 
for examination the draft law on parties and other social-political organisations[6] 
worked out by the Ministry of Justice with the support of independent experts and 
specialised international organisations (IFES Moldova, USAID). The draft 
contained 59 articles structured into 8 chapters, with essential innovations 
including more detailed regulations on party building procedure and norms on 
funding of parties, financial control and transparency of financial activity. This 
document was adopted in the first reading in late 2000 and the Council of Europe 
examined it later[7]. The final examination of the document was suspended 
because of the political conflict in early 2002 and negotiations between the 
Government and the opposition (within the Roundtable). Further, in the virtue of 
the 2005 parliamentary elections, the parliamentary majority avoided 
approaching problems capable to give birth to political controversies. The 
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perspectives of resuming the examination of this draft were unclear. In all 
likelihood, the Parliament abandoned the idea to examine it, though it had earlier 
accepted this document in principle. 
4. Civil Code (2003) 
The new Civil Code, which contains norms on non-commercial organisations in 
the Section 5 of the Book I, entered into force on June 12, 2003. The Code 
attributes the political parties to a form of these organisations – the association 
(Article 181 (2) of the Civil Code), but it allows the law (Article 181 (6) of the Civil 
Code) to establish the particularities of constitution, functioning and legal status 
of various associations. However, the general norms of the Code must find an 
adequate coverage in this legislation and, therefore, a new law on parties must 
contain special and clear norms concerning: 
• The statute of the organisation (including the name, domicile, date of birth, 
citizenship, and other data from identity acts of founders);  
• Conduct of economic activities (statutory or additional);  
• Conflict of interests and ways to settle it.  
Of course, these provisions cannot be expressed in diverse formulations, with the 
legislator enjoying a quite large field of manoeuvre, and this is an extremely 
important thing under the domination of a parliamentary majority with specific 
preferences, and they are formulated in the new law on parties. 
5. Draft law on financing of political parties and electoral campaigns (2005) 
Accordingly to the Legislative Programme for 2005–2009, the Parliament has 
pledged to examine in 2006 a draft law on financing of political parties and 
electoral campaigns (this being a priority against corruption). The Government 
had also pledged to ensure the elaboration and promotion of this document by 
including it in the National Programme on Implementation of the Moldova-NATO 
Individual Partnership Action Plan[8]. The Ministry of Justice has worked out a 
special draft law aimed to regulate the financing of parties in general and during 
electoral campaigns, with the draft containing regulations concerning the control 
on funding, restrictions (interdictions) and sanctions for violation of legal norms in 
the field[9]. The Government approved the document on autumn 2005 and 
delivered it to the Parliament. However, the legislature did not adopt it in the due 
time, and it seems that it gave up the examination of this document without 
revealing the reasons. 
II. Draft law on political parties (2006)[10] 
Several lawmakers representing the Communist and Christian Democratic 
factions tabled a new draft organic law on political parties in late 2006, and the 
document was conceptually examined and approved through an urgent 
procedure without preliminary public debates[11]. Just on spring 2007, after the 
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CoE has examined the draft, an ampler and in-depth debate on this document 
was organised as part of a conference held with the support of the CoE and 
OSCE, with the participation of developers of the initiative from the parliamentary 
agenda and other interested subjects[12]. Paradoxically, the topic did not raise a 
special interest among extra-parliamentary political parties, with their 
participation in debates being anaemic. Nor even parliamentary parties, except 
for developers, proved initiative and activism in debating the document, with most 
of objections and proposals coming from CoE experts and nongovernmental 
organisations. 
Essential provisions of the new draft law[13] envisage: 
• Restrictions for parties (Article 3); 
• Competences of political parties (Article 4); 
• State support (Article 5 and others); 
• Record of parties (Article 12); 
• Obligations and responsibility, including the obligation of holding general 
assemblies and updating the lists (Article 20); 
• Reorganisation, suspension and cessation of activity, including for 
inactivity (Chapter 5); 
• Patrimony and funds (Chapter 7). 
The main innovation of the draft is the inclusion of new provisions on financing of 
political parties from state budget besides regulation on creation, registration and 
work of parties. 
Shortcomings of the draft and criticism against this document 
The document was worked out in a hurry, without taking into consideration the 
previous objectives and proposals regarding the regulation of this field. Thus, 
international and national experts reiterated the old shortcomings and signalled 
other faults such as the shortage and imperfection of regulations on financing, 
transparency, responsibility, correlation between diverse legal acts of the same 
level. 
a) Opinions by CoE experts[14] 
According to expertises by the CoE secretary-general and the Venice 
Commission, the draft law is an "important step forward", a document providing 
the "opportunity to build a modern party funding system and to enhance 
transparency and responsibility as regards the financing of parties." At the same 
time, CoE experts indicated many provisions that should be improved, as well as 
matters unregulated by the new document. The shortcomings and objections 
envisage general regulations (creation, registration, functioning and dissolution of 
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parties) and special regulations (financing, control on activity and use of funds, 
transparency and responsibility, etc.). 
General shortcomings: 
• A short and general communication is attached to the draft without an 
adequately explained memoir[15];  
• The restrictions on activity of parties (Article 3) are too severe and they do 
not fully meet the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights (ECPHR), affect the fundamental democratic principles[16];  
• The orders allowing the ‘citizens of the Republic of Moldova" and banning 
foreigners and stateless people to join political parties are restrictive and 
contrary to the CoE standards[17];  
• Article 9, which imposes political parties to have at least 5,000 members in 
order to get registered (including at least 150 residents of 2nd-level 
territorial units) are excessive compared with thresholds in democratic 
countries in West Europe. These norms harden the freedom of association 
(Article 11 ECPCH)[18];  
• The provisions of Article 9 requiring data on party members and Article 20 
requiring the periodical updating of these data are disproportional with the 
standards accepted by the Venice Commission[19].  
Objections and shortcomings regarding funding, control, reporting, transparency: 
• Article 27 contains internal contradictions because it allows parties to own 
certain goods and on the other hand bans the economic and commercial 
activity without appropriate explanations (publishing for itself and 
others)[20];  
• The provisions of Article 28 which exempt some incomes from taxes may 
produce difficulties and misinterpretations; these problems must be 
remedied through additional elaborations and concomitant modification of 
the fiscal legislation[21];  
• Stipulations forbidding foreign financing (Article 28) must be essentially 
clarified because they are able to limit the rights of Moldovan citizens from 
other countries and this would be a violation of Article 11 of ECPHR[22];  
• Article 28 does not clearly explain the funding restrictions for some public 
entities (state institutions and foundations, municipal enterprises). Also, it 
does not ban the contributions on behalf of others (the so-called 
"laundered" contributions)[23];  
• The draft law must be completed and seriously amended as regards[24] a 
better internal control; sanctions for violation of rules on functioning of 
parties and electoral campaigns; independent monitoring (by CEC, etc.); 
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reporting; illegal expenses; prohibited funds; external appeals (media, 
citizens, etc.); control on financial reports and state budget funding, etc.  
b) Other essential shortcomings of the draft[25]: 
1. The draft was unfairly elaborated and promoted in the first (conceptual) 
reading, without preliminary public debates. The argumentation and 
communication attached to the draft are insufficient and superficial, which 
means that the elaboration was not preceded by scientific investigations 
regarding political, social, economic, financial, legal, other consequences 
of the regulations. 
2. The document lacks an economic-financial ground, though the new 
regulations require very large founds in order to be enforced. The lack of a 
ground reveals a formal approaching of financial aspects, while the 
budgetary funding is considered the main innovation of the draft. 
3. The text of the draft does not fully comply with the legislation in effect: the 
Civil Code (regarding the definition of parties as private legal entities 
without a lucrative goal), Electoral Code (regarding the CEC status and 
competence, rights of parties during electoral campaigns, financial and 
material matters, etc.); Tax Code (record of funds, reporting, facilities), 
and others. 
4. The criterion "of administrative territorial organisation of a party" is vaguely 
formulated, and the level of administrative-territorial organisation 
(national/republican, 1st or 2nd level) is not specified. 
5. The draft does not stipulate the functioning of regional parties, while the 
administrative territorial organisation of Moldova admits the regional level 
(ATU Gagauzia and Transnistria). 
6. Provisions of Article 2 (2) harden the functioning of leading bodies, 
branches and structures of political parties in the Transnistrian region 
because this territory is not "under the jurisdiction of the Republic of 
Moldova." On the other hand, the law admits the existence of branches, 
but it does not stipulate the creation and functioning of these entities. 
7. Article 2 (3) stipulates some interdictions regarding the creation of 
"structures" and "bodies" of political parties "within institutions, enterprises 
and organisations," without making clear inherent aspects: – what do 
"structures and bodies" mean (officialised entities with pre-established 
competences or simple political groups); – any enterprises, institutions 
and organisations (public, private, with or without legal entity) are 
envisaged; – the formula "within" means building officialised structures 
and bodies as part of structures and bodies of political parties in the 
territory (in headquarters) of these entities, etc.). 
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8. The draft does not stipulate express important principles regarding the 
functioning of party such as legality, transparency, independence, self-
administration, gender equality. 
9. Norms and notions from Articles 3 and 24 ("democratic values", "rule of 
law", "ideas running counter the Constitution") are capable to limit political 
rights, the freedom of association and expression, a fact signalled by CoE 
experts, but developers neglected the relevant ECHR jurisprudence[26] 
when they worked out the draft. 
10. Article 4 (3) will be applied on "political alliances" which are also 
envisaged by Article 14 (1) (i) of the draft, but the law does not regulate 
their creation and legal status (the Moldovan legislation does not regulate 
these matters in general). 
11. Article 7 (4) is equivocally formulated, the interdiction it refers to 
(participation in political events) may be temporary; it does not establish a 
concrete connection between interdiction and exercising of a public 
position. It does not clearly indicate the positions for which the 
membership to a political party is prohibited, and this is a serious 
omission. 
12. The last paragraph from Article 10 awards pretty wide discretionary 
attributions to the Ministry of Justice: 
o It lacks express grounds to demand the annulment of the 
registration (for example, forgery of signatures of members);  
o It lacks a concrete term when the annulment of registration can be 
demanded;  
o It does not stipulate the right to further remedy problems and 
obstacles;  
o Now the annulment of registration may be sought for minor reasons 
(some provisions which, accordingly to functionaries, obstructed the 
registration, are discovered in the programme or statute; some 
errors are discovered in the declaration on party headquarter; some 
signatures by party members are withdrawn and the minimum 
number is lower than stipulated by law, etc.).  
13. In order to ensure transparency and a plenary access to public 
information, some provisions must be introduced in Article 12 to explain 
the information from the register of political parties kept by the Ministry of 
Justice (as for example: name; registration decision; headquarters; leader 
and his contact details; statute and programme of the party; international 
affiliation, etc.). The law would stipulate that the information from the 
register must be published on the website of the Ministry of Justice within 
a certain term. 
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14. In order to enhance the responsibility and ensure an adequate control 
inside the party, the law should oblige parties to indicate the following 
provisions in the statutes: - concerning internal control (auditing) (on 
management of funds and patrimony); – the structure in charge with 
control (auditors, financial officers) and the creation of this structure, 
prevention of conflicts of interests; – rights of members to be informed 
(anytime) about revenues and expenses of the party. 
15. Article 25 stipulates the possibility to demand the dissolution of a political 
party because the "goal or activity of the party has become illicit or 
contrary to the public order", with this formula allowing abusive 
interpretations and applications (any insignificant violation of public order 
is contrary to the public order). According to the article, the dissolution is 
allowed if "the party follows another goal than the one stipulated by its 
statute and programme," and this fact bans a temporary, minor, non-
dangerous goal because it is not formally indicated in the statute or 
programme of the party. 
16. Article 28 concerning funds of political parties must be modified and 
completed, so that to enhance the responsibility of parties, facilitate the 
legal activity and prevent and combat eventual violations: 
o The possibility to raise funds from bank credits and interests, sales 
of party goods, rent of own spaces;  
o The party statute must regulate the "use" of the membership fees;  
o Collection and payment operations cannot pass via accounts in 
foreign banks (with a major foreign capital) even if they are based 
(representations, branches) in Moldova;  
o The ban of foreign funds for parties must also cover the funding by 
joint enterprises, by foreign citizens in Moldova (with a permanent 
or temporary stay permit); the draft must clarify the funding of 
parties by individuals and legal entities from the region uncontrolled 
by Moldovan authorities (Transnistria);  
o Completions are required to oblige parties to report their funding 
every year.  
17. Article 32 (1) introduces additional requirements on budgetary funding, but 
they are useless or even abusive, since once succeeding to the 
Parliament, parties honour the following conditions: registration as an 
electoral contestant (independent or electoral bloc), succession of 
electoral threshold (only those succeeding the threshold can hold 
mandates), organisation into parliamentary factions (it is presumed 
because otherwise the party loses many advantages linked to the 
parliamentary activity). 
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18. The regulation of Article 32 (1) obliging parties to hold at least 20 
mandates in district councils (of 2nd level) is inadequately formulated. 
Thus, a party holding tens and even hundreds of mandates in local 
councils of villages and cities, tens/hundreds of mayoral mandates will be 
deprived of budgetary funding because it was not active during elections 
in district councils, which are a medium, intermediary chain of local public 
administration. 
19. In order to improve the prevention and fight against money laundering, 
Article 29 shall be completed with provisions which: 
o Prohibit parties to receive donations from persons who are not 
allowed to cast their ballots; 
o Ban parties to receive donations from gambling businesses 
(casinos, lotteries, bets, etc.); prohibit or limit the financial 
donations by associations, foundations and trade unions; 
o Limit cash donations at a certain amount, while larger amounts will 
be donated via appropriately registered financial institutions; 
o Describe donations as public information available to any interested 
person. These donations must be estimated accordingly to their 
market value; 
o Oblige parties to publish general reports on their incomes and 
expenses in Monitorul Oficial. 
• Article 33 must be completed as follows: 
o To limit the use of state budget allocations for (considerable, 
excessive) remuneration of party members, in particular, of 
members of leading bodies of parties; 
o Provisions concerning "personnel expenses" and "expenses for 
organisation of political activities" are unclear and incapable to 
prevent negative practices of abusive distribution of funds between 
party leaders; 
o External control on use of state budget funding (which may be 
exercised by the Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Finance); 
o The article must oblige parties to periodically report the use of state 
budget allocations. 
• In order to modify the existing provisions and approve new amendments, 
the electoral legislation must be revised at the same time with adoption 
and enforcement of the law, so that: 
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o To regulate the financing of electoral campaigns of parties from 
state budget;  
o To ban the use of funds (from budget or own) in order to bribe 
electors, to hold charity actions during electoral periods;  
o To limit the use of administrative resources by electoral candidates, 
parliamentary political parties, which enjoy more advantages than 
other parties (have a priority access to public mass media, receive 
rooms for meetings, enjoy access to technical means).  
• The draft does not regulate enough the aspects regarding the accordance 
of acts and activities of existing parties with the new legal regulations. The 
formula from Article VI, which says that "political parties registered in the 
Republic of Moldova will adjust their documents on constitution and 
functioning and work to this law" by a certain date is too general and 
ambiguous, and therefore, the final and transitory regulations must 
essentially develop by taking into account the detailed description of all 
matters: legal, temporary, organisational-institutional, financial, etc. 
III. Conclusions 
Now the legislation lacks common or consensually accepted approaches 
regarding: 
• The minimum number of members needed to create a party; 
• The plenitude of data on members that must be presented for registration 
and permanently preserved by the Ministry of Justice; 
• The annual or pre-electoral updating of the number of members and 
emerging consequences; 
• The dissolution of a party for inactivity; 
• The distribution of state budget funds (accordingly to former or future 
general or local electoral performances; number of voters; number of 
members, and others); 
• Constitution and rights of political and electoral alliances/blocs; 
• Re-registration of all parties after enforcement of the new regulations, etc. 
Thus, in spite of concerns of foreign experts and international organisations 
regarding additional requirements for registration and functioning of parties, the 
Constitutional Court of Moldova does not observe any problems in establishing 
such requirements (representation, presentation of personal data, re-
registration). 
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At the same time, the dissolution of parties on inactivity reasons is a form of 
dissolving a party, and the Constitutional Court had earlier noticed that the 
Parliament does not have the right to extend the dissolution conditions as a 
sanctioning of political parties over strictly delimited constitutional limits stipulated 
by Article 41 (4). 
The draft from the Parliament’s agenda could help develop the political party 
system in Moldova, but the initial version of this document raises many 
questions, leaving room for abusive interpretations, and it does not introduce 
enough mechanisms to prevent and combat frauds. 
Including the regulations on creation and functioning of parties and norms on 
funding of parties into a single document and omitting detailed aspects on 
financing of electoral campaigns is not argued. Discordances with the Election 
Code and Tax Code will permanently emerge, challenging litigations that the 
norms of this draft will be incapable to settle. Therefore, the law on political 
parties and the law on funding of political parties and their electoral campaigns 
must be separately elaborated and examined. 
In order to prevent accusations of political favouritism and retroactive application 
of the law, which privilege the acting parliamentary parties, the new provisions on 
funding of political parties from the state budget should be enforced after the next 
general elections (the 2009 parliamentary elections). 
The regulations on bookkeeping, control and audit of financial and material 
means of parties, their circulation and use must be described in details, without 
allowing equivocal interpretations. At the same time, the sanctions for violations 
in this area should be strictly and clearly regulated, and these breaches should 
be clearly formulated. 
The competence of the Central Electoral Commission in this field must be widely 
approached and we subscribe to the opinion by a CoE expert that the 
Commission should be awarded additional rights, including to perform the audit 
or demand it, to work out and impose specific regulations on financing and 
financial audit. 
Abuses during funding campaigns reduce the credibility of the democratic 
system, deep the distrust of electors towards functioning of this system for sure. 
Statements on reformation of the electoral funding system should be followed by 
real proposals and tested and efficient mechanisms. However, these 
mechanisms are uncomfortable for those falling under the incidence of these 
regulations and ruling parties or parties with a certain rating experience the 
discomfort, so that the reformation is only mimicked. 
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